Medical innovations have improved treatment for many diseases but have simultaneously raised spending on health care. Many health economists believe that technological change is the major factor driving the growth of the health-care sector. Whether quality has increased as much as spending-that is, whether new innovations raise or lower quality-adjusted prices in health care-is a central question for both positive and normative health-care analysis. We do a systematic analysis of the impact of technological change on quality-adjusted prices, with over 6,000 comparisons between innovations and incumbent technologies. We observe each innovation's price and quality, as well as the price and quality of an incumbent technology treating the same disease. We find that the innovations' quality-adjusted prices are higher than the incumbents' for about two-thirds of innovations. Nevertheless, we argue that quality-adjusted prices may fall or rise over time depending on the effect of competition on incumbents' prices over time. A 4-percent price decline due to competition would offset the cross-sectional price difference for a majority of indications. We discuss the conditions particular to health care that may cause increases in quality-adjusted prices over time rather than decreases as experienced in many other industries.
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I. Introduction
Given the rapid expansion of health-care spending in most developed countries, there is ongoing debate about whether this spending growth is accompanied by sufficient growth in the quality of care. Rapid medical innovation that enables us to treat previously untreatable diseases and improve existing treatments is a significant contributor to both spending growth and improvements in care. A central question of health economics is whether these innovations increase the value of care-that is, whether they raise the benefits of health care more than they increase the cost. In other words, do quality-adjusted prices rise or fall with new innovations?
In this paper, we provide new systematic evidence on how medical innovations affect quality-adjusted prices for thousands of innovations. We obtain such a large set of technologies by recognizing the economic content of medical "cost-effectiveness" studies, performed over the course of at least half a century. By using an economic lens to reinterpret the cost-effectiveness literature, we can gain more systematic insight into the impact of technological change on quality-adjusted prices than previous findings focused on a few indications. In particular, what this literature calls the "cost-effectiveness ratio" is the price of the technology divided by the quality of the treatment. It is a quality-adjusted price, analogous to the price per square foot of housing. The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) compares the price and quality of a new treatment with a "comparator"-usually the incumbent technology representing the standard of care before the arrival of the new treatment. The goal of the ICER is to measure the marginal quality-adjusted price of the added quality provided by the new innovation. Therefore, studies reporting ICER levels often offer measures of both the quality and the price of innovations and incumbent treatments. To provide an aggregate and systematic analysis, we use a database of the universe of cost-effectiveness studies from Tufts Medical Center, called the Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Registry (CEAR), which contains over 4,000 cost-effectiveness studies. CEAR is an extensive data set of cost-effectiveness articles published in the peer-reviewed medical literature over the last 40 years.
Our main finding concerns the cross-sectional relationship between new innovations and incumbent technologies; that is, how the quality-adjusted prices between the two compare at a given point in time. Using the CEAR data, we find that the median innovation has a quality-adjusted price about 4 percent higher than the incumbent's qualityadjusted price, with 68 percent of new technologies having higher quality-adjusted prices than those of the incumbents. This estimate comes from a combination of slightly higher quality (median 1 percent) and moderately higher price (median 8 percent) . We analyze potential drivers of differences in quality-adjusted prices between innovators and incumbents. We look at how an innovation's price, relative to the incumbent's, varies with the type of treatment, the type of disease, and the difference in efficacy between the two treatments. We also consider regional differences potentially induced by third-party payment policies. We find that the innovator's quality-adjusted price, relative to the incumbent's, tends to be lower in the United States and European Union compared with other countries.
It is often argued that health care differs from other industries in that qualityadjusted prices rise over time instead of falling as they do in other industries, such as telecommunications. At first glance, our findings seem consistent with that pattern. However, this ignores the time series behavior of prices of a given technology due to competition. In particular, new therapeutic competition from related innovations and generic competition due to patent expiration often cause prices of a given treatment to fall over time. Therefore, the overall price of treating a disease may fall over time, even though new innovations have higher prices than incumbents in the cross section. In other words, a new innovation can be more expensive than the incumbent after entry and still be cheaper than the incumbent was before entry. We calibrate that if competition caused innovations to cut prices by at least 4.2 percent before the entry of subsequent new technologies, then overall quality-adjusted prices would fall for half of the markets, given the observed innovator premium in the cross section.
This paper relates to several strands of work. Aggregate growth accounting attributes the residual from health-care spending regression to the impact of technological change but does not measure innovation directly (Newhouse 1992) . Jena and Philipson (2008) use the CEAR data to address topics of a broader nature than the product-specific evaluations for which it was designed by analyzing the relationship between cost-effectiveness thresholds and innovation incentives. This paper also relates to existing, more narrowly focused studies that look at quality-adjusted price trends within a given indication, such as Cutler et al. (1998) for heart disease and Frank, Berndt, and Busch (1999) for depression.
We extend this literature by offering more aggregated and systematic evidence on these issues. As we discuss in the conclusion, there are some shortcomings in this systematic evidence, such as unobserved selection as to which innovations are included in the database. Nevertheless, we believe using this evidence is superior to not using it and relying only on case studies of treatments for specific indications. We value the breadth and volume of the CEAR data despite the limitations created by its aggregate nature, just as economists value the information available in national accounts while recognizing and working to improve their data shortcomings.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the CEAR data on costeffectiveness studies. Section III considers the cross-sectional findings of the relationship between price and quality of new innovations and incumbent technologies. Section IV discusses time trends of quality-adjusted prices and potential explanations for the discussed findings. Finally, Section V summarizes the findings and concludes.
II. CEAR Data
We use data from the Tufts Medical Center Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Registry (CEAR). CEAR is a data set of the methods and findings of about 4,800 published cost-utility analysis articles, some of which cover multiple treatments. The database is intended to be a comprehensive collection of all such articles published in the peer-reviewed medical literature. The registry uses two trained reviewers to independently review each article and collect a wide variety of variables. Their analyses are compared for accuracy. Notes: This table summarizes the studies in the Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Registry. The US and EU dummies refer to the country in which the study was conducted. The score of study reliability is a rating that the reviewers compiling the database give to each study they read. SOC is the standard of care (incumbent) treatment. Quality is measured in quality-adjusted life years (QALYs). Prices are in 2014 US dollars. The ICER is the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, which is the difference in prices between the innovator and the SOC divided by the difference in qualities.
Each article compares a newer treatment option with one or more standards of care (SOC). The registry collects and organizes data on article information, disease classification, study methodology, and measurement details. The data set covers articles published between 1976 and 2014, with the number of articles increasing from an average of one per year during the first 10 years, to an average of about 475 articles per year during the last 5 years. As a result, 85 percent of the data come from papers published between 2004 and 2014. About half of the articles, all written since 2002, have prices and qualities separately for the innovation and the standard of care. The other articles only have a single measure of the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER)-the difference in price divided by the difference in quality.
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Summary statistics for the main variables are in Table 1 . Each article may provide multiple studies (comparing different subgroups, patient settings, or standards of care), so we have a total of 12,560 studies, about 6,500 of which have complete price and quality data. The main variables of interest are the ones related to cost and effectiveness. The price of an intervention (either the innovation or the standard of care) includes all the costs that the article was able to measure-both direct costs and non-health-care costs.
3 Since the total cost is also the full price, we refer to it as the price of the treatment. 4 The price for both the new treatment and the SOC are measured per person treated. We convert them to 2014 US dollars using the medical consumer price index and yearly exchange rates.
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Effectiveness is measured in quality-adjusted life years (QALY), which is a combination of the length of life and quality of life added by the treatment. A year of perfect health is equal to one QALY and a year of death is zero QALY, with different levels of health in between so that a person is indifferent between living x years at a QALY of 1/x and one year at perfect health. The effectiveness of a treatment is how many QALYs it gives a patient, which we refer to as quality. Similar to costs, both the innovation and the SOC have quality measures.
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Prices of the innovations range dramatically, from around $282 to $315,324 between the 5th and 95th percentile, since a wide variety of treatments are included. The median is around $22,000. Quality also has a large range, between 0.26 and 27 QALY for the 5th and 95th percentile, with a median of 7.8 QALY. The treatments with higher price and quality include surgeries such as prophylactic oophorectomy, a surgery that reduces the risk of breast cancer and ovarian cancer, or treatments that have to be administered with very high frequency over a very long period, such as HIV antiretroviral therapies atazanavirritonavir or lopinavir-ritonavir.
One potential concern about using CEAR is that there may be heterogeneity in the quality of studies that are recorded by the registry. An unusual feature of these data is that each study in the registry is evaluated in terms of its quality through a scoring system. In compiling the data set, the readers of the registry rate each article on a scale from 1 3 The data codebook defines direct medical costs as "Health care resource costs related to the intervention and its side effects. These costs include those impacts directly attributable to the intervention and those related to current and future consequences to the intervention (e.g., hospitalization, MD or other provider, long-term care, other health care which includes medications, outpatient procedures, and laboratory costs)" and non-health-care costs as "Non-health care [costs] resources related to the intervention and its side effects (e.g., travel time to doctor, caregiver time and workplace productivity impacts, transportation costs, patient productivity costs)" (CEVR 2012, 29) . Only about a quarter of the studies list direct costs separately and less than 5 percent list non-health costs separately, so we focus on the total costs. 4 About a fifth of the studies refer to "social cost" and try to include costs or savings from additional treatment needed or avoided, rather than just the price of the treatment. This more inclusive measure may be closer to the true price from a societal welfare perspective. We control for the type of cost measure used in our regressions, but it does not affect the results. 5 We omit 193 observations where either the innovation or the SOC has negative cost or the ICER, price, or price per QALY for the innovation or the SOC is over $10 million. These observations drastically increase the variance in the data and the mean for some subgroups and can therefore distort the linear regressions. The quantile regressions (and median statistics) are qualitatively unaffected. 6 We omit 141 observations with quality values greater than 100 (since it does not make sense for a treatment to add more than 100 years to someone's life) or negative quality values. to 7, based on perceived correctness and comprehensiveness. This feature tells us which observations we should rely on more. We report our findings for the overall sample of studies as well as for the high-score studies-studies that have the median score rating or higher.
In discussing the other study characteristics, we limit the sample to the 6,472 studies for which we have price and quality data for both the innovation and the standard of care. There are studies from 70 countries, but North America and Europe account for 81 percent of the studies, including 38 percent from the United States and 17 percent from the United Kingdom. The data set includes variables on the primary disease addressed by the treatment, the treatment's type of intervention, and the study sponsor. There are 65 disease categories, with about 50 percent of the studies coming from the five most studied diseases (infectious diseases (12 percent), cardiovascular diseases (12 percent), malignant neoplasms (12 percent), musculoskeletal and rheumatologic diseases (8 percent), and neuropsychiatric/neurological conditions (4 percent).
7 Each study covers one or more types of interventions including pharmaceutical (54 percent), surgical (11 percent), screening (18 percent), and medical procedures (11 percent). 8 The studies include sponsors, with the main sponsors being governments (38 percent), industry pharmaceutical, biotech, and medical device companies (32 percent), and nonprofit organizations (8 percent). (As with interventions, there may be multiple sponsors for a treatment, so the sponsor indicators average to greater than one.)
There may be selection issues in determining which articles get studied and published, which would bias our attempts to understand how the average new innovation affects quality-adjusted prices. For instance, if only the most cost-effective new treatments get studied or there is a publication bias in favor of findings of high cost-effectiveness, that would bias our estimates. Analysis of published cost-effectiveness studies does not suggest that there is a clear direction to the selection bias-cost-effectiveness analyses tend to report "positive" or "negative" results but not intermediate results (Bell et al. 2006 )-but we cannot rule it out. For selection to be an issue, it would need to occur independently F I G U R E 1 . Price-quality space of the intervention type, disease, country, and sponsor type since we control for these. We do not have data on market share, so we are comparing product-level differences in price and quality between the innovation and the standard of care.
There may also be nonrandom selection as to which studies in the CEAR have complete price and quality data. Most obviously, studies prior to 2002 do not have these data, so our results apply to more recent innovations. Looking at the ICER, which is available from the beginning, we see slight downward trends over time. Within the more recent studies there does not appear to be a relationship between the level of the ICER and whether the prices and qualities are recorded, though entries for innovations with quality improvements relative to the SOC are slightly less likely to be complete. 
III. Comparing Innovators and Incumbents in the Cross-section
The measurements provided by the CEAR are highly relevant to economists interested in the value of health care in terms of quality-adjusted prices for health. Figure 1 depicts a schematic of the variables measured in the CEAR in a traditional quality-price space. The incumbent technology corresponds to the standard of care and has quality and price (q s , p s ), while the new innovation has quality and price (q, p). The slopes from the origin represent the quality-adjusted prices; the slope between the incumbent's and the innovator's quality-price pairs represents the ICER. The figure illustrates that the average price of quality (quality-adjusted price) of the innovator is larger than that of the incumbent when the marginal price (ICER) is higher than the quality-adjusted price of the incumbent. Put simply, the average rises if and only if the marginal price is higher than the previous average.
F I G U R E 2 . Price and quality differences
Notes: The x-axis is the difference in quality between the innovation and the incumbent as a percentage of the incumbent's quality. The y-axis is the same measure for price. The top number in each section is the percentage of observations that fall in that quadrant or octant, including the outliers that are censored from the graph. They do not sum to 100% because of the 2% of observations that fall on one of the axes. The numbers in parentheses are the average percentage difference in quality and price for observations in that quadrant.
If one imagines centering a graph around the incumbent's price and quality, (q s , p s ), the quadrants represent combinations of price and quality differences that the new innovator can represent. For example, in the northeast quadrant the innovator has both higher quality and price; within that quadrant, quality-adjusted prices rise if price differences dominate quality differences. Figure 2 provides the unconditional scatterplot of the joint distribution of price and quality differences between innovations and incumbents. In this figure, the origin represents an incumbent's quality and price, and the axes reflect the percentage difference in quality and price between the innovator and the incumbent. The dashed 45-degree line represents when the innovator has the same quality-adjusted price as the incumbent, which corresponds to when the percentage difference in price equals the percentage difference in quality: . In general, both price and quality are higher for the new innovation relative to the incumbent. There is a price increase in 78 percent of observations and a quality increase in 85 percent. The distribution is very skewed to the right. The average innovation increases price by 139 percent relative to the incumbent, but the median is an 8 percent increase; the average quality difference is 26 percent, but the median is 1 percent. The percentage change in price has a much wider range than the percentage change in quality. The 31 percent of innovations below the 45-degree line (light gray) in Figure 2 have lower quality-adjusted prices. The innovations with higher quality-adjusted prices than the incumbent are split into the 11 percent that lower quality (dark gray) and the 56 percent that improve quality (black). Even though these innovations have higher quality-adjusted prices, they can make consumers better off relative to incumbent treatments if they increase quality.
With extreme substitutability of demand across treatments, we would not expect to see treatments with a higher price and lower quality or a lower price and higher quality (the off-diagonal regions in Figure 2 where (p 2 − p 1 ) · (q 2 − q 1 ) < 0). This is broadly true in the data, as 69 percent of the innovations lie in the diagonal quadrants where higher quality treatments command higher prices. However, note that there is a nontrivial fraction of innovations with higher quality and lower price (19 percent), but nevertheless they do not capture the entire market and end the use of the SOC. There are also some innovations that enter with a higher price and lower quality (10 percent). The existence of these innovations may be due to heterogeneity in treatment effects. Another explanation is that the first type of innovation will eventually replace the SOC after being shown to be of higher value and the latter will exit after it becomes evident they are of lower value.
The median quality-adjusted prices for new innovations and the SOC, measured as the cost per QALY, are $2,700 and $2,400 respectively. Figure 3 plots the distribution of the ratio of the quality-adjusted prices of the new innovation and the SOC, . If this quality-adjusted price ratio is above one, it means the new innovation had a higher quality-adjusted price than the SOC. The histogram indicates that a high fraction of new technologies do not change quality-adjusted prices much, but new innovations do tend to have higher quality-adjusted prices than the SOCs. The median ratio is 1.04, meaning the quality-adjusted price of the innovation is 4 percent higher than the standard of care; the distribution is very right-skewed with a standard deviation of 32, so only 2.4 percent of innovations have cost-effectiveness ratios that are statistically larger than one. If we focus on highly scored studies, the median is about the same, but the standard deviation is even higher. Only 0.9 percent of those studies are statistically different from one.
These are the overall effects for all disease categories and modes of intervention. Table 2 breaks down the difference in quality-adjusted price for the most common disease categories. Infectious disease, malignant neoplasms, and breast cancer have the highest quality-adjusted prices relative to the incumbents. Table 3 does the same for intervention types.
10 Pharmaceuticals are the intervention type with the highest relative price. Educational interventions tend to be less expensive relative to the incumbent and also vary less. The differences across intervention type are not as robust to the exclusion of lowscored studies as the disease categories. These tables indicate that the large variation we see in the relative cost-effectiveness of an innovation is not due primarily to differences across disease categories or treatment types. There is more variation within categories than across categories. Lastly, Table 4 does the same analysis by sponsor type. Studies sponsored by health-care or professional organizations tend to find larger differences.
F I G U R E 3 . Ratio of quality-adjusted prices
Notes: This graph shows the distribution across innovations of the ratio of innovator's and incumbent's quality-adjusted prices. For readability, the graph omits studies with a cost-effectiveness ratio above 3, thereby censoring 8% of observations. Highly scored refers to studies with at least the median rating given by the readers.
Studies by pharmaceutical or drug companies do tend to find smaller differences in quality-adjusted prices, but again, the variation within each sponsor type is much larger than the difference across types.
One reason innovators may command high quality-adjusted prices is if they offer "breakthrough" innovations. The large treatment improvement from these innovations may allow the innovator to charge a higher price. Since the quality is also higher, the effect on quality-adjusted price is ambiguous. To investigate these effects we examine the impact of the quality difference (q − q s ) on the relative price. As shown in Table 5 , for highly scored studies, innovations in the top quartile of quality improvement tend to have higher quality-adjusted price ratios. The mean is about 0.15 higher, and the median is 0.034-0.06 higher, meaning the percentage difference in quality-adjusted price is 3-6 percentage points higher. The difference is much smaller and statistically insignificant if we look at all studies instead of just the highly scored ones, so it is not clear how robust this relationship is. Note that the last column of Table 5 controls for the type of intervention, disease, and sponsor. If certain types of interventions or diseases have higher quality-adjusted price ratios because they have higher quality improvements, one may want to include that in the measured effect, rather than controlling for it. qs . The first two columns are linear regressions and omit the top 1% of quality-adjusted price ratios; the last two columns are median regressions. Columns 2 and 4 include dummies for each type of intervention, disease category treated, the type of sponsor the study had, and the type of cost it measured. All regressions include only highly scored studies-those that received at least the median ranking from the readers. Standard errors are in parentheses. a p < 0.001, b p < 0.01, c p < 0.05. qs , on dummies for the country or region in which the study took place. The first two columns are linear regressions and omit the top 1% of quality-adjusted price ratios; the last two columns are median regressions. Columns 2 and 4 include dummies for each type of intervention, disease category being treated, the type of sponsor the study had, and the type of cost it measured. All regressions include only highly scored studies-those that received at least the median ranking from the readers. Studies in the UK are also included in the EU category, so the coefficient on the UK dummy is relative to the level in the EU. Standard errors are in parentheses. a p < 0.001, b p < 0.01, c p < 0.05.
TA B L E 2 . Percentage difference in quality-adjusted price by disease type

TA B L E 6 . Quality-adjusted price ratio by geography
Another factor that may drive price differences are the price controls more frequently imposed in Europe than in the United States. Price controls may affect both the new innovation and the incumbent, so they may not affect the quality-adjusted price ratio. As shown in Table 6 , there is no systematic difference in the ratio of quality-adjusted price between studies done in the United States and in Europe, including the United Kingdom. However, these countries and Japan have substantially lower quality-adjusted price ratios than studies done in the rest of the world. In the United States and the European Union, the quality-adjusted price ratio is about 0.2-0.3 lower on average; the median is about 0.06 lower. These results are qualitatively unchanged if we look at all studies instead of just highly rated ones.
Pharmaceuticals make up about half of our sample, and the high prices of new drugs have received a lot of attention in both academic and policy analysis. Table 7 looks at how the quality-adjusted price ratios for pharmaceutical innovations in highly rated studies differ in different time blocks. Pharmaceutical innovations have somewhat higher prices than others, with the effect driven by studies from 2011 to 2014 having a median (mean) qs , as the dependent variable. It uses only highly scored studies-those that received at least the median ranking from the readers. The first two columns are linear regressions and omit the top 1% of quality-adjusted price ratios; the last three columns are median regressions. Columns 1 and 3 look at the difference between pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical innovations; columns 2, 4, and 5 interact the pharmaceutical dummy with three time periods. Column 5 includes dummies for each disease category treated, the type of sponsor the study had, and the type of cost it measured. Standard errors are in parentheses. a p < 0.001, b p < 0.01, c p < 0.05. quality-adjusted price ratio that is 0.0638 (0.108) higher than other innovations.
TA B L E 7 . Quality-adjusted price ratio of pharmaceuticals
11 These results are consistent with the idea that new drugs have been more expensive to an extent not accounted for by their therapeutic value.
IV. Implications for the Time Series of Prices
Our evidence suggests that the quality-adjusted price of an innovation is often higher than the incumbent standard of care once the new innovation has entered the market. However, the overall time trend in prices does not depend only on the cross-sectional difference Effect of Technological Change on Prices // hu lt et a l . between innovators and incumbents, but also on the difference in price over time within products. Figure 4 shows two hypothetical cross sections of price and quality relationships over time where each subsequent entry raises quality, as in a quality ladder model. Each year, a new product enters with a higher quality and the prices of the incumbents fall. In both cases, the price-quality relationship is convex within a year: the entrant has a higher quality-adjusted price than existing products, so quality-adjusted price is increasing in quality. However, the fact that new innovations may have higher quality-adjusted prices in the cross section does not restrict the path of quality-adjusted prices of new innovations over time-the top point on each line. The overall trend in quality-adjusted price can be decreasing (Figure 4a ) or increasing (Figure 4b ). Figure 5 demonstrates this same idea by considering the quality-adjusted price of each product over time. Figure 5a shows a market where the price of each product falls over time, particularly when a new entry occurs, but the higher prices of new products cause an overall upward trend in qualityadjusted prices. Figure 5b shows a market where the fall in prices upon entry is large relative to the cross-sectional difference between the incumbent and the entrant, so there is an overall downward trend. Innovators having a higher price at a given point in time is consistent with, for example, both Cutler et al. (1998) who found falling quality-adjusted prices over time for heart attack treatments, and Howard et al. (2015) , who found rising quality-adjusted prices over time for oncology drugs.
For each innovation, we calculate how much the incumbent's price would have had to drop so that the incumbent's pre-entry quality-adjusted price would have been equal to what the entrant's post-entry quality-adjusted price ended up being. There are 32 percent of innovations that have lower quality-adjusted prices than the incumbent post-entry, so their prices are lower than the incumbent's pre-entry price, even if there were no drop. For the median innovation among the other 68 percent, a 15 percent drop in the incumbent's price would mean the incumbent's pre-entry quality-adjusted price equaled the entrant's quality-adjusted price. If the incumbent prices dropped 75 percent, then 95 percent of those innovations (whose quality-adjusted prices are higher than the incumbent's postentry price) would have prices lower than the incumbent's pre-entry price.
A. I L LU S T R AT I O N F O R T W O I M P O R TA N T C A S E S T U D I E S
Much of the policy discussion of pharmaceutical pricing in the last few years has been centered on new "specialty drugs" and whether their incremental benefits justify their higher prices, that is, whether they have higher or lower quality-adjusted prices. We use two specialty drug classes: treatments for the hepatitis C virus (HCV) and multiple sclerosis (MS) to illustrate potential differences in time series and cross-sectional pricing patterns (as shown hypothetically in Figure 5 ).
In the case of hepatitis C, Figure 6a shows the price patterns for the different products over time, with the entry date defined as the start of the series. Because the HCV drugs are fairly new, there are relatively few observations in the CEAR data, so we supplement from other sources.
12 Sovaldi was the first innovation that offered a major increase in quality through essentially curing HCV through a three-month treatment. As the graph indicates, the incumbent Victrelis dropped its price dramatically around Solvaldi's entry. Thus even though comparing their quality-adjusted prices in 2014, just after this entry occurred, would show the new innovation was more expensive, there was a substantial decrease in quality-adjusted prices. The HCV case is illustrative of the more general idea that when 12 For Victrelis, CEAR has price and QALY estimates in 2012 and 2014, from which we calculate qualityadjusted prices. For Sovaldi we use the company's prices and announced discounts for 2014 and 2015 (Beasley 2015) , combined with the QALY estimate from a 2013 CEAR study. We get the QALY and initial price for Harvoni from Zhang, Bastian, and Griffin (2015) , which is the same type of study as the articles in CEAR, just published more recently. We again use the announced discounts to adjust the price over time. For example, the 2,552 $/QALY number for Harvoni in 2015 is the $94,500 that Zhang, Bastian, and Griffin (2015) say a course of treatment costs, divided by their estimated quality of 20 QALYs times 0.54 to account for the 46 percent discount reported by Beasley (2015) .
F I G U R E 6 . Quality-adjusted prices over time
Note: This graph shows the quality-adjusted prices over time. Panel (a) is hepatitis C drugs and Panel (b) is multiple sclerosis drugs. For Victrelis, the data are from two studies in the CEAR. For Sovaldi the prices come from Beasley (2015) and the QALY is from a 2013 CEAR study. For Harvoni, the QALY and initial price are from Zhang et al. (2015) and the 2014 and 2015 price discounts are from Beasley (2015) . For the multiple sclerosis drugs, the QALY estimates are the average from the CEAR studies and yearly prices are from Hartung et al. (2015) . therapeutic price competition occurs through innovation, cross-sectional and time series differences can be offsetting.
The price patterns for multiple sclerosis drugs show a very different story. Figure 6b shows quality-adjusted prices for MS drugs over time. 13 If anything, the entry of Rebif in 2002 coincides with the incumbents raising prices; the prices for all drugs are increasing over time. Therefore, the difference in quality-adjusted price in 2004 between the new innovation, Rebif, and the incumbent, Avonex, understates the upward trend in prices in the market.
New drugs are less likely to cause price decreases when they are not good substitutes for the incumbents. While Sovaldi was a good substitute for existing hepatitis C drugs, MS treatments are less substitutable than treatments for some other diseases for a few reasons. First, there is enormous heterogeneity in the MS population and treatment response, so chemically similar drugs may have very different outcomes for the same patient (Lucchinetti et al. 2000) . Second, MS is managed and not cured by treatments, so patients often need to take a range of MS drugs over their course of therapy. Third, there are significant differences across MS drugs in their efficacy, tolerability, and mode of administration.
14 Since the drugs are weaker substitutes, they do not compete as much, so 13 These drugs have been around longer, so there are more observations in CEAR, but none of the drugs appear yearly. We use the (average) QALY estimate from the CEAR and yearly prices from Hartung et al. (2015) to get yearly quality-adjusted prices. 14 For example, Avonex is an injection treatment that is often used as a first-line treatment because it has mild side effects though low efficacy. Tysabri, which is administered by infusion, is often used as a later-line treatment because it has high efficacy and potentially serious side effects (Smith et al. 2010) .
new drugs are less likely to cause incumbents to lower their prices. The MS case is illustrative of the more general idea that absent therapeutic price competition, prices for a given product may increase over time, so the cross-sectional and time series differences may be mutually reinforcing.
V. Conclusion
We compare quality-adjusted prices of innovators and incumbents by providing an economic interpretation of the medical cost-effectiveness literature. We find that two-thirds of innovators have quality-adjusted prices that are higher than those of the incumbents; the median difference in quality-adjusted price is 4 percent. We find no systematic differences by disease type, though pharmaceuticals have somewhat larger differences, especially in recent years. There is some evidence that an innovator's quality-adjusted price is particularly likely to be high relative to that of the incumbent when there is a large difference in quality between the two. Studies conducted in the European Union and the United States have somewhat smaller quality-adjusted price ratios than studies performed elsewhere, but innovations still tend to be more expensive than the incumbent technologies. We show how quality-adjusted prices may still fall over time, depending on the price trends of the incumbents: a price decline of 4 percent between a product's entry and the entry of the subsequent innovation would be sufficient to generate a net decrease in quality-adjusted prices over time in the majority of products. The data we use have several shortcomings that a more complete collection of CEA studies with a larger set of measures could potentially overcome. One issue is the selection of technologies studied, which may not be representative of all technologies. In particular, CEA studies may be done more often for innovations that are costlier or higher quality. Second, CEA studies may vary in their perspective and therefore contain different costs (though if this is true for both the standard of care and the new innovation, these costs are measured uniformly across the two). Third, there may be several CEA studies on the same technology, in which case conflicting results may be obtained. However, we believe some of these shortcomings apply even more so to the reliance on case studies to analyze the impact of technological change in the treatment of certain indications.
Overall, we view the study of CEAR-type data as a useful and evolving process in which improving the data over time is feasible and would lead to further improved analysis. These improvements are not much different from the improvements of national economic accounts made to address their shortcomings over time. We do not want to dismiss the informative value of national accounts while they are being improved. Likewise, we believe that relying on case studies rather than these more systematic data would be misguided. The question is not whether the data are perfect, but rather how they compare to alternative data for studying this important topic.
We end by discussing some reasons why innovation may affect quality-adjusted prices differently in health care than in other industries, such as telecommunications, where next-generation technologies often reduce quality-adjusted prices. Health-care innovations may have fewer substitutes than those in other industries: a "first in class" designation can give a firm substantial market power, which may persist longer for innovations in health care than innovations in other industries because the FDA approval process can delay new entrants.
Even average levels of market power may enable innovators to capture increased consumer value for treatments with a higher price. Potential sources of increased consumer value are unmeasured cost offsets, complementarity between a treatment and income, or complementarity between a treatment and the prevailing level of health. If a new innovation is only one component of the full set of costs associated with a diagnosis, then its impact on the other episode costs-"cost offsets"-may be an important part of the value of the innovation. Drugs are usually a small fraction of the total episode cost but may generate cost offsets by preventing future doctor or hospital visits. If monopoly power allows the entrant to capture these cost offsets in a higher price for the innovation, then the quality-adjusted price may seem higher if the cost savings are not measured (though true total costs per quality may be lower). This explanation for higher quality-adjusted prices of innovators could be tested empirically if total costs and treatment costs could be separated, in which case cost offsets should have a positive effect on the innovator's premium.
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Two forms of health-related complementarities may raise quality-adjusted prices over time. One is the complementarity between health and more health care: a greater level of health over time raises the value of additional health going forward. For example, the value of treating a life-threatening disease is higher the longer you live in the absence of the disease. As discussed by Dow, Philipson, and Sala-i-Martin (1999) , such complementarities are implied by competing risk models of mortality, which essentially involve a Leontief production function of overall length of life from competing cause-specific lifetimes. If a healthier population places a higher value on health improvements from a given disease and this can be priced out by new innovators, quality-adjusted prices may rise with the baseline health level.
The second health complementarity is between health and consumption (Hall and Jones 2007) . The willingness to pay for longevity increases with economic growth because the utility loss from forgoing consumption to extend life is lower when one is wealthier. Patent-protected monopolies may be able to extract this increased value of health and raise prices more and more for the same gains in health as incomes rise.
Another proposed explanation for increasing quality-adjusted prices in health care is that a large portion of care is paid for by third-party payers-either public or private-so demand is not sensitive to price. However, this is more of an explanation for why markups in health care may be high than for why they would be increasing (without an increase in health insurance coverage). Others have argued that third-party payers decrease the incentive for cost-reducing innovations (Weisbrod 1991) . However, patients ultimately have to demand and pay the resulting higher premiums. Moreover, third-party payers seem almost "hyper-rational" in their purchasing decisions in that they use the very same costeffectiveness studies analyzed here. In very few other industries do buyers use explicit quantitative metrics like these to quantify the costs and quality of products before purchasing. Though reimbursement by payers based on cost-effectiveness is less institutionalized in the more privately financed US market than in Europe, the majority of cost-effectiveness studies are actually done for the US market and funded by US manufacturers that would be unlikely to fund them unless they influenced US payers.
In summary, we believe that more systematic inquiry is needed on the impact of technological change on quality-adjusted prices in health care. The central debate is around whether increased spending is justified by greater health benefits. We have argued that the cost-effectiveness literature has implicitly analyzed such quality-adjusted prices over the last half century, but the analysis of quality-adjusted prices by economists has not incorporated this large body of evidence.
